When are you idiots going to learn?:
For over ten years before Bush came into office, every democrat in
Washington was warning very sternly that Iraq had WMDs and nuclear
weapons. In 1998 President Clinton announced his warning of imminent
war with Iraq to remove WMDs, nuclear weapons, and Saddam, and to make
a democracy there. DEMOCRATS CHEERED.
DEMOCRATS CHEERED.
The only reason democrats stopped cheering and decided the idea was
terrible is because the President is now Republican.
Democrat war protesters by the hundreds of thousands claimed that we
would lose 50,000 American troops to Saddam's WMDs, and when it became
apparent that the democrats all those years, and the Republicans now,
were wrong, and that there were no apparent WMDs in Iraq, those same
protesters claimed they knew it all along, and that the President is a
liar about WMDs in Iraq!
The real reason the democrats are shifting back and forth about the war
is because Republicans won't help them get laws passed that make their
perverse lifestyles legal.
That's it: That is everything.
voice from the past
Greg Palast wrote:
> The memo that has "IMPEACH HIM" written all over it.
>
> The top-level government memo marked "SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL",
> dated eight months before Bush sent us into Iraq, following a closed
> meeting with the President, reads, "Military action was now seen as
> inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action
> justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence
> and facts were being fixed around the policy."
>
> Read that again: "The intelligence and facts were being fixed...."
>
> For years, after each damning report on BBC TV, viewers inevitably ask
me,
> "Isn't this grounds for impeachment?" -- vote rigging, a blind eye to
> terror and the bin Ladens before 9-11, and so on. Evil, stupidity and
> self-dealing are shameful but not impeachable. What's needed is a "high
> crime or misdemeanor."
>
> And if this ain't it, nothing is.
>
> The memo uncovered this week by the TIMES, goes on to describe an
elaborate
> plan by George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair to hoodwink
the
> lanet into supporting an attack on Iraq knowing full well the evidence
for
> war was a phony.
>
> A conspiracy to commit serial fraud is, under federal law, racketeering.
> However, the Mob's schemes never cost so many lives. Here's more. "Bush
had
> made up his mind to take military action. But the case was thin. Saddam
was
> not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that
of
> Libya, North Korea or Iran."
>
> Really? But Mr. Bush told us, "Intelligence gathered by this and other
> governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess
and
> conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."
>
> A month ago, the Silberman-Robb Commission issued its report on WMD
> intelligence before the war, dismissing claims that Bush fixed the facts
> with this snooty, condescending conclusion written directly to the
> President, "After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication
> that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq's
> weapons." We now know the report was a bogus 618 pages of thick
> whitewash aimed to let Bush off the hook for his murderous mendacity.
> Read on: The invasion build-up was then set, says the memo, "beginning
> 30 days before the US Congressional elections." Mission accomplished.
> You should parse the entire memo -- reprinted below -- and see if you
> can make it through its three pages without losing your lunch. Now sharp
> readers may note they didn't see this memo, in fact, printed in the New
York
> Times. It wasn't. Rather, it was splashed across the front pages of the
> Times of LONDON on Monday.
>
> It has effectively finished the last, sorry remnants of Tony Blair's
> political career. (While his Labor Party will most assuredly win the
> elections Thursday, Prime Minister Blair is expected, possibly within
> months, to be shoved overboard in favor of his Chancellor of the
> Exchequer, a political execution which requires only a vote of the
> Labour party's members in Parliament.)
>
> But in the US, barely a word. The New York Times covers this hard
> evidence of Bush's fabrication of a casus belli as some "British"
> elections story. Apparently, our President's fraud isn't "news fit to
> print."
>
> My colleagues in the UK press have skewered Blair, digging out more
> incriminating memos, challenging the official government factoids and
> fibs. But in the US press nada, bubkes, zilch. Bush fixed the facts and
> somehow that's a story for "over there."
>
> The Republicans impeached Bill Clinton over his cigar and Monica's
> affections. And the US media could print nothing else. Now, we have the
> stone, cold evidence of bending intelligence to sell us on death by the
> thousands, and neither a Republican Congress nor what is laughably
> called US journalism thought it worth a second look.
>
> My friend Daniel Ellsberg once said that what's good about the American
> people is that you have to lie to them. What's bad about Americans is
> that it's so easy to do.
>
> Greg Palast, former columnist for Britain's
> Guardian papers, is the author of the New York Times bestseller, "The
> Best Democracy Money Can Buy". Subscribe to his columns at
GregPalast.COM.
> Media requests to CONTACT(at)GregPalast.COM.
> Permission to reprint with attribution granted.
>
> [Here it is - the secret smoking gun memo
> - discovered by the Times of London. - GP]
>
> SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
> DAVID MANNING
>
> From: Matthew Rycroft
>
> Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02
>
> cc: Defence Secretary,Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General,
> Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C,
> Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
>
> IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
>
> Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss
Iraq.
>
> This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It
> should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
>
> John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
> Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
> overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was
> worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not
> convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime
> expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that
> regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public
> was probably narrowly based.
>
> C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
> shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
> wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
> conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
> being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
> route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's
> record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after
> military action.
>
> CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
> Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
>
> The two broad US options were:
>
> (a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72
> hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead
time
> of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
>
> (b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous
> air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of
60
> days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous
option.
>
> The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia
> and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were
> also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK
> involvement were:
>
> (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
>
> (ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
>
> (iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a
> discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down
two
> Iraqi divisions.
>
> The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
> activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken,
> but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to
> begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
> Congressional elections.
>
> The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this
> week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military
> action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.
> Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was
> less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan
> for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors.
> This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
>
> The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a
> legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases:
> self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The
> first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR
> 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of
> course change.
>
> The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically
> and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime
> change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was
> producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with
> Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would
> support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan
> worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military
> plan the space to work.
>
> On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was
> workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
>
> For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one,
> or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said
> that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the
> Defence Secretary.
>
> The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military
> plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
> interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
> differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the
> ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
>
> John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
> only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
>
> The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military
> involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many
> in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It
> would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political
> context to Bush.
>
> Conclusions:
>
> (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
> military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning
before we
> could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that
we
> were considering a range of options.
>
> (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds
> could be spent in preparation for this operation.
>
> (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
> military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the
week.
>
> (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background
> on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to
Saddam. He
> would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries
> in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
>
> (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence
> update.
>
> (f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
> consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers. (I have written
> separately to commissionthis follow-up work.)
>
> MATTHEW RYCROFT
> (Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
>
>
>
>
> IMPEACHMENT TIME: "FACTS WERE FIXED."
>
>
>
> [Greg Palast] [The Observer - Britain's Premier Sunday
Newspaper - Guardian Media Group]
>
>
>
> IMPEACHMENT TIME: "FACTS WERE FIXED."
> _Special to_ BuzzFlash
> Thursday, May 5, 2005
> By Greg Palast
>
> Here it is. The smoking gun. The memo that has "IMPEACH HIM" written
all over it.
>
> The top-level government memo marked "SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL,"
dated eight months before Bush sent us into Iraq, following a closed
meeting with the President, reads, "Military action was now seen as
inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence
and facts were being fixed around the policy."
>
> Read that again: "The intelligence and facts were being fixed...."
>
> For years, after each damning report on BBC TV, viewers inevitably ask
me, "Isn't this grounds for impeachment?" -- vote rigging, a blind eye to
terror and the bin Ladens before 9-11, and so on. Evil, stupidity and
self-dealing are shameful but not impeachable. What's needed is a "high
crime or misdemeanor."
>
> And if this ain't it, nothing is.
>
> The memo uncovered this week by the _Times_, goes on to describe an
elaborate plan by George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair to
hoodwink the planet into supporting an attack on Iraq knowing full well
the evidence for war was a phony.
>
> A conspiracy to commit serial fraud is, under federal law,
racketeering. However, the Mob's schemes never cost so many lives.
>
> Here's more. "Bush had made up his mind to take military action. But
the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."
>
> Really? But Mr. Bush told us, "Intelligence gathered by this and other
governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and
conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."
>
> A month ago, the Silberman-Robb Commission issued its report on WMD
intelligence before the war, dismissing claims that Bush fixed the facts
with this snooty, condescending conclusion written directly to the
President, "After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication
that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq's
weapons."
>
> We now know the report was a bogus 618 pages of thick whitewash aimed
to let Bush off the hook for his murderous mendacity.
>
> Read on: The invasion build-up was then set, says the memo, "beginning
30 days before the US Congressional elections." Mission accomplished.
>
> You should parse the entire memo -- reprinted below -- and see if you
can make it through its three pages without losing your lunch.
>
> Now sharp readers may note they didn't see this memo, in fact, printed
in the New York Times. It wasn't. Rather, it was splashed across the
front pages of the Times of LONDON on Monday.
>
> It has effectively finished the last, sorry remnants of Tony Blair's
political career. (While his Labor Party will most assuredly win the
elections Thursday, Prime Minister Blair is expected, possibly within
months, to be shoved overboard in favor of his Chancellor of the
Exchequer, a political execution which requires only a vote of the Labour
party's members in Parliament.)
>
> But in the US, barely a word. The New York Times covers this hard
evidence of Bush's fabrication of a casus belli as some "British"
elections story. Apparently, our President's fraud isn't "news fit to
print."
>
> My colleagues in the UK press have skewered Blair, digging out more
incriminating memos, challenging the official government factoids and
fibs. But in the US press ? nada, bubkes, zilch. Bush fixed the facts and
somehow that's a story for "over there."
>
> The Republicans impeached Bill Clinton over his cigar and Monica's
affections. And the US media could print nothing else.
>
> Now, we have the stone, cold evidence of bending intelligence to sell
us on death by the thousands, and neither a Republican Congress nor what
is laughably called US journalism thought it worth a second look.
>
> My friend Daniel Ellsberg once said that what's good about the American
people is that you have to lie to them. What's bad about Americans is that
it's so easy to do.
>
>
> _Greg Palast, former columnist for Britain's Guardian papers, is the
author of the New York Times bestseller,_ The Best Democracy Money Can
Buy.
> _Subscribe to his columns at _
href=http://www.gregpalast.com>www.GregPalast.com
Media requests to
contact(at)gregpalast.com Permission to reprint with attribution granted.
>
>
> *[Here it is - the secret smoking gun memo - discovered by the Times of
London. - GP]*
>
> SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
> DAVID MANNING
> From: Matthew Rycroft
> Date: 23 July 2002
> S 195 /02
>
> cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard
Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell
>
> IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
>
> Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss
Iraq.
>
> This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made.
It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents.
>
> John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not
convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected
their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army
morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably
narrowly based.
>
> C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route,
and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record.
There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military
action.
>
> CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
>
> The two broad US options were:
>
> (a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72
hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time
of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
>
> (b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000),
continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead
time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous
option.
>
> The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego
Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf
states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK
involvement were:
>
> (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
>
> (ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
>
> (iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with
a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two
Iraqi divisions.
>
> The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but
he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin
was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.
>
> The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this
week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military
action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was
less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan
for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors.
This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
>
> The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a
legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases:
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first
and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of
three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
>
> The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically
and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change
and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing
the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran.
If the political context were right, people would support regime change.
The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we
had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
>
> On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan
was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
>
> For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said
that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the
Defence Secretary.
>
> The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military
plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
>
> John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
>
> The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK
military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned
that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum
route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the
political context to Bush.
>
> Conclusions:
>
> (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we
were considering a range of options.
>
> (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds
could be spent in preparation for this operation.
>
> (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
>
> (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background
on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
>
> He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member
states.
>
> (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence
update.
>
> (f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
>
> (I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
>
> MATTHEW RYCROFT
>
> (Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
>
>
> www.buzzflash.com
>
>
>
>
> Site Design by Creative Constructs - www.CreativeConstructs.com
|
